The New York Times recently editorialized on the decline and fall of Atlanta Fire Department Chief Kelvin Cochran. Cochran, deeply religious, lost his job primarily for publishing, and distributing to some of his staff, a book in which his adamant opposition to homosexuality was clearly articulated. The Times‘ editorial sees no free speech or religious freedom infringement in the firing:
Nobody can tell Mr. Cochran what he can or cannot believe. If he wants to work as a public official, however, he may not foist his religious views on other city employees who have the right to a boss who does not speak of them as second-class citizens.
First, there was no evidence that Cochran engaged in discriminatory practices as a chief. Second, the Times‘ standard is largely untenable. A public official is free to believe anything, he just cannot act upon those beliefs within the public sphere, at least according to the Times. Of course, the First Amendment prevents the government, even fire chiefs, from establishing a religion. This does not require, however, public officials to hide their faith. If Cochran used his book to proselytize staffers and then used their reactions for or against them, it would be improper and illegal. The record indicates, such as we know it now, that he used his faith to guide his actions and to create a culture. No one should expect Cochran to divide himself, to leave his faith in the church. That is not how thoroughly religious people behave. Faith is all-consuming. It animates the whole, not merely some of the parts.
This is, admittedly, a delicate problem. To what degree can potentially discriminatory beliefs be privately held but not publicly acted upon? The proof must be in the actions themselves. Since there was no evidence that Cochran discriminated against anyone, it seems, in reality, he lived up to the standard the Times put forth, as unreasonable as it might be. So, why was he fired? Cochran claims it was due to his faith. This is probably also simplistic. While he was not fired for being a Christian, he was fired when his controversial beliefs became publicly known. It could be though that this distinction makes no meaningful difference to the outcome.
At one point in time, racial views functioned, and still do (see Donald Sterling), in a similar capacity. As the Times notes, no one would defend Cochran if his religion caused him to think that whites were superior to African-Americans. Undoubtedly, this is true. It is fascinating, however, that few question those with either Jewish or Islamic beliefs that would be remarkably similar to Cochran’s, at least as they relate to homosexuality. Does this mean that those who hold to traditional views on the issue are simply unfit for public office?
Surely this will become a major talking point in the upcoming presidential election. Will Republican candidates be asked whether or not they think homosexual actions are sinful? In some ways, it is a fair question, but only if the talking heads lob such volleys in all directions. After all, this has been a common occurrence on abortion. Democrats, especially Roman Catholics, have been asked the extent to which their faith may or may not conflict with abortion as a matter of policy. Largely, we have let them off the hook if they answered something like, “well, I believe it is wrong, but I don’t think that should be a matter of public policy. Ultimately, it should be up to the woman to choose.” Will something like that be a sufficient answer on the matter of homosexuality? We will see.
We are, to varying degrees, free to believe whatever we choose, just as the Times states. It is also true that within the private sector, those beliefs can easily have occupational consequences. Remember, though, the government in Atlanta determined that Cochran’s beliefs were too costly and fired him. Again, if there was evidence that he had mistreated employees and discriminated against them based on his own views, this would be a different matter. Since there is no such evidence, we have, like it or not, entered into First Amendment territory.