In Romans 12:18, we are told to be at peace with all men, so far as it depends on you. There is a recognition that we only get to control one person–ourselves, and we don’t do that particularly well. There is a reason why self-control is so encouraged in the Bible, as it’s so little seen in our own world. Nevertheless, this is the beginning of wisdom in broader relationships–try to be the good party, but recognize that the other party may not want the same result. In that, we are ultimately told in v19 to leave room for the wrath of God to secure ultimate justice. This applies to individuals and collective actors. We can’t control what others will do, our only task is to do the right thing and trust God.

In economics, a significant sub-discipline is game theory, which examines strategic behavior in terms of repeated interaction. Coca-Cola’s decision to cut soft drink prices, for example, depends on how it expects Pepsi to react to that change. Understanding your competitor’s reaction function, and then optimizing your decision based on their likely reaction is at the heart of game theory.* Game theory is in no way limited to market decisions of oligopolists, but is broadly applicable in optimizing your strategy based on what others might do. It was used quite often by the state department and the military to war game nuclear conflicts “back in the day.” Regular Berean readers may remember my reference to Robert Axlerod’s classic work on game theory, The Evolution of Cooperation, where Axlerod showed the dominant strategy across 1000s of simulations and repeat games is the simple “tit for tat,” where the optimal response is to respond in kind. Escalating can lead to increased conflict, whereas responding in kind offers a chance for the other side to cease, knowing that if they punch you in the nose, you will punch them back–so it’s not worth it. Suffice it to say, not responding in kind leads to the really bad result of the bully on the playground repeatedly misbehaving (hence my repeated criticisms of Mr. Biden’s foreign policy). When Mr. Putin invades Georgia, then takes Crimea, and then amasses 70,000 troops on the border after Biden’s Afghanistan debacle, and we did little to nothing, what did we think would happen? How did Mr. Putin’s view of the United States reaction function change after leaving the Trump administration and getting Biden, and watching him go wobbly? Was it not rational calculation on Mr. Putin’s part that the cost of invading Ukraine was now significantly lower than previously? Now he may have miscalculated, but that can only be known ex post. Ex ante, he had every reason to believe his timing would never be better.

The chatter today is about Mr. Putin’s threat of tactical nukes in Ukraine, in response to the United States allowing the use of ATACMS by Ukraine, which are already targeting munitions depots in Russia. This is a real fear, but not highly probable. It’s important to note a few things. First, Russia has repeatedly drawn red lines that it does nothing when crossed in this conflict. The only thing Russia really has is its ultimate nuclear blackmail, so whenever your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. But the use of tactical nukes would be in Ukraine. Putin knows that were he to attack the U.S. or NATO it’s “game over man.” At least he should know that–hopefully even the weak Biden administration is communicating that to him clearly and firmly. The risk of escalation in Ukraine of Russia’s using of tactical nukes falls primarily on Ukraine. I think they are in the best position of doing what is better militarily for their country. Sure, if they punch the bully in the nose back, the bully may actually pummel them to oblivion. But maybe they are not willing to accept being repeatedly punched by the bully, and become Putin’s vassal state. I for one support their choice (more below). Second, to have our position be that we must allow Putin to keep sizeable portions of Ukraine’s territory lest he go nuclear gets to the economists’ favorite question–and then what? Mr. Putin (nor his successors) is not going to be satisfied with this. He will consolidate and then quickly take Moldova, and from that encirclement of Ukraine from the south (with Putin’s vassal state of Belarus to the north), he will ultimately be back for a bigger bite of Ukraine. Just look not only at broader history, but Putin’s history. Once we accept his nuclear blackmail, where does it stop? Russia (and their private army, the Wagner group) are all around the world propping up wretched wicked regimes. They have created a new axis of evil with NK, China and Iran (and seeking more). Are we really so naive to think they will stop with a large bite of Ukraine?

I will repeat an earlier post. Our strategic objective in Ukraine is for Russia to pay as large a price as possible for as little territory as possible such that their cost/benefit calculus is radically changed. And if not changed, at least killed/wounded as many troops as possible such that their revanchist dreams are put as far off as possible. Our strategic objective is simply this: let Russia bleed. And the more they bleed, the better. The more they bleed, the less likely we actually have to go to war against them. And when the Ukrainians are bearing the primary cost of making them bleed, we’re getting the good deal–not Ukraine.

* For those that watched that older movie, A Beautiful Mind, you may recall John Nash’s struggle with mental illness. He was a mathematician who ultimately won the Nobel Prize in economics for his work in game theory. Every grad Ph.D. student has had to solve problems to achieve a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which maps out strategic behavior and optimizing for what another will do.