Critics of capitalism or markets are not too difficult to find.  They come mainly from the ideological Left, but some also come from what appears to be a non-Leftist position of postmodernism.  I actually believe most postmoderns lean Left, some violently, but for now I will let that go.  Finally I have found a fairly good representative work that criticizes markets combining Christianity with postmodern thought.  It is worth it for the Bereans readers to know the anti-market arguments and their weaknesses.

I have just about finished a book by Daniel M. Bell, Jr. entitled The Economy of Desire:  Christianity and Capitalism in a Postmodern World, published by Baker Academic in 2012. The book bills itself as a Christian critique of capitalism from a postmodern perspective.  Bell uses the philosopher/critics Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze as the basis of his argument, along with his own interpretations and uses of Scripture.  While it might be helpful to discuss the nature of postmodernism before focusing specifically on the anti-market critique, space would not at all permit, as postmodernism has been and is the subject endless debate.  Suffice it to say that Foucault and Deleuze were postmodern thinkers.

Bell begins the heart of his book in Chapter 2 (after a lengthy discussion of postmodernism and the philosophies of Foucault and Deleuze) by defining “desire” and linking it to economic ideas and structures.  Bell suggests that there is a form of desire in American and Western culture that is not defined by the abandonment of all discipline and inhibition, but that contains within itself its own “logic” or discipline and at the same time entices individuals to desire in certain predictable (to him) ways.  The discipline is capitalism and the problem is that we “desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (Bell, 59, quoting Foucault in Preface to Anti-Oedipus, 1983).  Human desire is “captured by capitalism” (Bell, 40).  Capitalism also, in Bell’s view, “overwhelms the…nation-state,” resulting in what postmoderns call “neoliberalism” or free market institutional arrangements.  He goes further to assert that “all states [now] serve capitalism” (Ibid, 65).  Moreover, capitalism for Bell (and others) is not a matter of defining a particular method of production or productive activity.  It concerns a “totalizing” of life.  At this point one might ask why it matters all that much.  Bell will say that, in Christian terms, such a condition “nudges” Christians away from glorifying God and “consumes us” as it were.  It is free markets themselves which do this.  They are then inherently problematic.

In Chapter 3, Bell outlines what he sees as specific problems with capitalism.  This chapter, along with Chapter 4, is the core of the book.  Bell says that the problem with capitalism is not that it fails to work, but the kind of work it does.  It is, he agrees far more able to produce wealth and income than any other form.  But he writes that even if everyone on earth were a millionaire, capitalism would still present a problem.  Sin, Bell says, is “a corruption of our desire,” as well as breaking God’s law (Ibid, 86).  Since “every economic system is about human desire,” and the economy is “powered by human desire,” the “capitalist economy of desire is a manifestation of sin because it both corrupts desire and obstructs communion” (Ibid., 88). Bell asks whether capitalism “enables and enhances humanity’s chief end of glorifying and enjoying God forever (Ibid., 88-89).  In this chapter Bell also takes a shot at Christians who find theological underpinnings in capitalism.

Chapter 4, entitled “Capitalist Theology,” consists of a series of elements that Bell views as characteristic of capitalist thought, and which he then will critique.  Bell begins with “the individual,” or what he asserts is the economic man (homo economicus).  According to Bell capitalism exalts the individual and denigrates collectivism and community (Ibid., 94-95).  Bell says that this basic orientation creates in individuals a “proprietary and possessive character” without obligation to society (Ibid., 96).  But Bell overstates his case by far.  Individuals are it is true the basic “building blocks” of free markets, since it is they or their families who engage in transactions, make calculations and decide how to allocate resources (firms are also “individuals” in a limited sense).  Collectivities do not make market decisions in general and if they were involved in all market decisions, markets would simply cease to exist.  But this does not mean that individuals have no sense on community.  On the contrary, all serious market thinkers know that we are situated in the context of all kinds of communities all the time and we form bonds with those communities that involve mutual respect and duty.  But in general market thinkers are not keen on coercive communities except in limited ways (law and order, etc.).  They believe that the individual is not “all duty” but also has rights as an individual and that this makes communities themselves work better.

Second, Bell attacks the notion that individuals ought to be “free to choose” (using Friedman’s terminology).  Bell attacks it because, as he writes, “expansion of choice is a virtue in and of itself” (Ibid., 98).  But no economist argues that choice is an end in itself.  It serves a utilitarian purpose, but a beneficial one, though it can, as any choice, always be exercised unwisely or unethically—regardless of the particular economic system.  Bell says the freedom of choice is “decidedly formal and negative,” formal in that “what we are free to choose is left undefined,” negative in that this freedom is freedom “from” interference, and not “for” some purpose (Ibid.).  But if such freedom were “for” it would have to be defined as uniformized, something everyone ought to desire.  This in turn would require coercion.  Moreover, who would determine what all of us ought to desire?  The state again would be necessary in a way that would potentially destroy freedom altogether.  Finally, Bell writes that this freedom from is necessary to make the “invisible hand” work.  Of course that is self-evident, but Bell seems to want a supremacy of a single purpose, at least in substantial spheres of life.

Third, Bell criticizes interest maximizing, that is, self-interest.  But he seems to conflate it with selfishness.  In addition, he believes self-interest “entails a rejection of any substantive notion of shared purpose or common good.”  But Bell has misunderstood self-interest, which is merely the endeavor to discover the highest net benefit in a given situation—not necessarily selfishly—and confused efficiency with the self-interest (see Ibid., 102).  Adam Smith also recognized the self-interest/selfishness distinction.

Two other elements Bell addresses are “insatiable desire” and “agony of competition.”  The former is the “unquenchable, infinite nature of human desire” (Ibid., 100).  But if Bell is correct this desire would exist regardless of the economic structures, and since no institution is perfect, should we not desire the best for all concerned in terms of well-being?  Bell treats the competition aspect as if humans are in a kind of war with others to satisfy our desires and get what we want.  For him, capitalism creates that kind of competition.  But competition cannot be seen as a desire to eliminate one’s competitors.  In fact, cooperation is usually required to get what one wants, even if he/she is completely egoistic.  Bell also believes that competition combined with desire to have makes humans in a capitalist context ignore or “forget” or lose sight of suffering due to market institutions—which he predictably asserts will occur (sweatshops, deaths, etc.)  Bell conveniently forgot that definitions must be given to alleged oppressions, and that in the absence of actual mistreatment, most of those working for lower wages (to make things for consumer wants elsewhere) would otherwise be starving in rural poverty or, as in the case of totalitarian and corrupt non-market contexts, be severely oppressed.  The alternatives must be included in any analysis.

Finally Bell raises the issue of commutative justice.  What Bell means is that “justice is strictly personal” (Ibid., 109).  It is, he adds, “solely a matter of enforcing the terms of voluntary, contractual exchanges” (Ibid.).  No particular outcome is required.  Obviously Bell wants a definition and application of justice that does attempt to guarantee some outcome—this is social justice.  But he forgets that commutative (or plain) justice does attempt to guarantee an outcome—that all are treated equally under law.  That goal itself leads to another outcome:  productivity, entrepreneurship, creativity, work with dignity are all encouraged by such rules of justice.  Nor can outcome-based justice actually achieve its goal.  It will level everyone to a miserable minimum or it will begin to favor some groups over others.  He also connects his lack of social justice to an outcome that he says will lead some to “fail through no merits of their own,” to “perish under the capitalist order” (Ibid., 110).  Is that what has happened in market-oriented nations?  I think not.  Is that what has happened in nations with non-market economic arrangements?  Definitely.  Moreover, no market advocate (except the most extreme libertarian) would deny at least a “safety net” to those unable to care for themselves.

Mainly this book is a criticism of capitalism.  It does not call for its abolition, but recognizes that that would be futile.  But the substance of the argument harkens back to the Social Gospel (1890-1920), Christian Socialism (1848-1854, 1877-1914) and the early years of Modern Liberalism (c. 1880-1920).  It also resonates with the New Christian Left (Jim Wallis and others).  Bell and others simply view markets through a quasi-Marxist lens that has been modified by a few postmodern ideas and terminology.  As I said above, most postmoderns, despite their protestations to the contrary appear to be ideologically Socialist.  This explains their negative attitude to markets.  But in fairness, Bell does add a definitely Christian focus—though he is too indebted to postmodern thought.  He is correct in that Christians do need to be careful of their attitudes.  We and the church still have responsibilities to others who are in dire straights.  And of course believers’ highest calling is to glorify God.  But that can be done in a market setting just as well, and sometimes better, than in any other institutional arrangement.   Our calling and vocation can legitimately be to “make money.”  And a market economy enables that.  In addition, millions of otherwise starving and destitute individuals have been raised out of abject poverty precisely because of markets—not in spite of them.  Do we want to bring about some universal shift in perspective that would destroy markets?  Moreover, though Bell does not call for ending markets—because he believes they are inevitable—he certainly accepts much greater government intervention, intervention that could also destroy markets and lead to misery for many (note N. Korea, Venezuela, China before the 1980s, USSR).

In the last four chapters, Bell attempts to offer an alternative to capitalism as an economy of desire.  As I said he sees it as futile to attempt to eliminate market systems.  He wishes to change the perspective of Christians to markets.   In the end, Bell says that perhaps capitalism is the best we can do, flawed as it is (Ibid., 215-216).  But in the meantime he commends various practices that he argues will remove in small ways the desire economy from individuals.  For example, the author mentions the neomonastic movement.  Some of his suggestions are ones Christians would and should agree with.  And we would certainly agree that it is bad hermeneutics and dangerous application to equate market institutions with Christianity.  They are not equivalent.  But it is possible to argue that the totality of God’s Word indicates varied practices and institutions that are consistent with the will of God.  It is not a huge step to say that if they are consistent with God’s Word, they will be successful in a broad sense if implemented.  Bell, though well-meaning, misses that point by focusing almost exclusively on the imperfections, which are bound to occur when human beings are involved.

A final problem is as I have mentioned, Bell’s use of postmodern thinkers like Deleuze and Foucault.  While they do give a few insights (even a broken clock is right twice in a day), their ontological, epistemological, ethical and deconstructive skepticism in the end undermines Christianity and all narratives.  Perhaps Bell would have been better served to exclude postmodernism altogether, but like many writers today, there is a strange fascination and attraction to it.  In the end it proves empty.

I apologize for the length of this review.  It is more of an essay.  But it is to my knowledge the most comprehensive critique of markets available from a Christian and postmodern perspective.  It therefore required detailed attention.