I must first apologize for the length of this post.  It is a bit involved, but because the subject is not so simple as we sometimes would like to believe.  As I consider the current state of government and of colleges and universities, and their dysfunction, I can’t help but do so in terms of a classification of types.  This is not a sacrosanct way to think about the way institutions operate, nor would I say that there a many pure types “out there.”  But I would like to posit that in this one view, my own, there are three kinds of types of institutional arrangements one might find in government entities or in colleges and universities, or, if you will, three types of emphases:

1. Form over substance
2. Substance over form
3. Mixture or balance of substance and form

But of course I have to define what I mean before this has any usefulness to anyone.  When I use the term “form” I am referring to a basic organizational attitude that values above all else, proper procedure.  Here we find the bureaucratic mentality that adopts the “by the book” way of doing things.  It tends to be rule-bound, rules being either formal or informal, or both, and to stress the following of those rules in all situations, even if a situation is out of the ordinary.  I don’t know whether certain types of people are attracted to this environment or not, but it seems certain that at least some are.  Reasons vary for such a stress.  Sometimes it is simply historical; the organization has always operated this way and alternative institutional designs are impossible to conceive.  Sometimes it is out of a desire to “control” behavior of employees/bureaucrats.  The desire to control is usually not out of a simple desire to lord it over others, but rather out of both distrust of what might go wrong with a ”looser” form as well as the associated desire to avoid potential trouble form the outside. Research indicates that large governmental organizations are subject to this form, though on the other side of the coin, it is more difficult to achieve the larger to institution becomes.  And the harder the agency heads try to “keep order” to more difficult it becomes to do so.

When I use the term “substance” I mean a stress on the content of what actually gets done that is consistent with the mission of the organization or with some more metaphysical standards (justice, responsiveness, an “educated person,” etc.).  Rules become less important and are conceived differently.  Whereas a stress on form leads to a fundamental approach that rules ought to govern all or most of what happens, and preferably under consolidated authority from the top down, a stress on substance tends to see rules as broadly “constitutional” in that the emphasis is on the basic “rules of the game” within which employees/bureaucrats are left basically free within the parameters of those basic rules.  Of course the “constitutional” rules are designed to be fundamental and “hard” but they operate much like rules of a basketball or football game—they allow “free” choice of decision-makers within the rules and to some larger extent, everyone in the organization becomes a decision-maker.

Finally when I speak of a form in which there is a mixture or balance of form and substance, I am referring to what is perhaps a bit more ambiguous, but also perhaps more common.  The only question then is how the balance is constituted, toward form or toward substance.  The organization may have “constitutional” rules, but it also has some measure of “ordinary” rules governing everyday actions. Few organizations operate with no ordinary rules, but one does find a wide variation among organizations as to the extent of those formal rules.  Some institutions allow substantial input from employees, and even have established mechanisms by which they may continuously not only be heard (“voice”) but are able to collectively participate in decision-making.  Others essentially rely on information flowing up a chain and orders flowing down, with ultimate decision-making in the hands of those at the top of the chain.  The heads may choose either to listen or not to listen or to filter out what they consider to be “noise” from below.  Whether the organization is “flat” or “tall” it may operate this same way, the difference being that information is more easily distorted as it flows up in a tall institutional form.

Now the most difficult question: Which emphasis is the better one?  Under what circumstances is deliberation and participation called for, or, alternatively under what circumstances are speed and dispatch called for.  Sheer deliberation for its own sake is not necessarily always desirable; sheer efficiency of operation is not always desirable, though the alternative may appear “messy.” Contrary to what the reader might expect, the answer is, “it depends.”  It depends crucially on what the organization is trying to accomplish, or, what is its mission, or, what service it is providing.  Let’s take a couple of examples.

The first comes from the world of government—national defense in wartime.  If a nation is at war, its first order of business is to win the war or remove the threat to its existence.  The public good of national defense ought to be organized to accomplish that goal, simply because if it is not accomplished there may be no government left.  Moreover, the nature of the problem is immediate—the immediate threat to security.  If a problem is immediate it generally requires speed and dispatch to deal with it.  In turn, the organizational type necessary to address that problem best is one that maximizes speed and dispatch.  This is not deliberative decision-making which, by definition, involves talk, compromise, listening, careful consideration of alternatives, etc.  In war, time for those is severely limited, so we choose (with almost no historical exceptions) the top-down form versus substance organizational approach.  The form is bureaucratic and depends on information up and orders down, both in forms that are not easily distorted or misunderstood.  Congress declares war, the president says to the Joint Chiefs, “win the war” and they in turn strategize and pass orders down in progressively detailed form to the very bottom of the chain so that each soldier, sailor, and airman, knows what to do at a given instance.  This description is of course simplistic and idealized, but in general it works.  There are of course obstacles: a superior enemy, incompetent leadership, basic human fallibility, and self-interest in the organization.  But the approach is necessary rather than paralysis.  The alternative however usually is much worse than the problems (costs) of large bureaucracy, given the situation.  If one pauses for deliberation, the war may be lost and….

I mentioned earlier possible self-interest among individual decision-makers in a bureaucracy.  Given human nature, this is always a possibility, along with human error.  Self-interest can be at work in any organization, and in any circumstance. It is no “respecter” of war or peace because people are people.  And it can have significant negative effects in any particular setting.  It cannot really be prevented, except by attempting to hire carefully from the most virtuous people.  And even then, no filter can completely eliminate it, in part because it arises because of the environment in which the individual bureaucrat finds himself.  But it can be reduced in various ways with adjustments to the organizational form.  I emphasize this issue because it is found in all organizations to some extent.  Individuals may have many motives: the good of the whole, the good of their specific program, their own well-being (salary, “perks,” etc.).   Some make the person an idealist while others make them more pragmatic, even “Machiavellian.”  But self-interest and its effects are a crucial consideration for any organizational form and regardless of the specific set of events.

In many organizations too, the primary value is loyalty.  This of course is not unique to any particular organization, as it is a personal trait.  But when it is found in an individual(s) in a hierarchical environment, it poses some unique challenges.  If the demand for loyalty is from the head of a centralized organization, then the question becomes, to what or whom must subordinates be loyal?  If it is to the mission or principles of the organization, there is not inherent problem (unless the mission is unethical of illegal).  But if it is simply to decisions of the head or a vague notion of loyalty for its own sake, the problem may arise of what happens if the head is clearly wrong or even if his decision is questionable.  Loyalty can become entrenched as the prime directive and the organization then may suffer because defective decision-making cannot be corrected.  To the extent subordinates just below the head adopt the value of loyalty, an effective obstacle is erected between the head and other employees.  Responsiveness is reduced.  Quality may decline (as measured appropriately).  Almost no centralized and hierarchical institutional form is self-correcting; it can ultimately only be corrected from the outside.

Now for my second example.  This one is higher education.  What is the type of service involved?  Education is basically the delivery of a body of knowledge in way that conduces to actual learning and preparation of students for their lives outside of college/university.  Some argue it is by nature a public good, and others that it is really a private good, but in reality it is provided by both private and public institutions.  Our first question is then, what is required to achieve those goals?  Though the answer is not self-evident, it appears that it is not speed and dispatch, unlike war.  The consequences of “getting it wrong” here outweigh those of a large or bureaucratic organization with its emphasis on speed (efficiency).  Lives are not immediately at stake, and on the other hand, lives can be changed for better or worse when the service is not optimal (though of course it can never be perfect).

Since deliberation would seem to be more important than simply “getting things done” it also would follow that the better form of organization would allow for much more formal participation and much less “top down” decision-making” authority.  The chain is less needed because within the broad “constitutional” rules, innovative and creative thought and involvement is less threatening.  Time is not an issue either, simply because taking more time allows for more deliberation (within limits).  Now once the deliberation has fully run its course with regard to a particular issue, then the final decision can be made with all relevant input and even with formal consent from the entire body of employees.  This is particularly important when it comes to issues such as curriculum (in all its scope—hours in a major, whom to hire, adjuncts, use of budget funds, etc.).  The reason for this is something Friedrich Hayek came upon many years ago: That local knowledge is better than central planning, because those “lower down” have a better working knowledge of actual needs and conditions than those at the top who might wish to plan everything.  It is not a matter of virtue either.  Even if the person at the top is well-meaning, he/she cannot have all the necessary knowledge and therefore cannot plan perfectly.  In other words, central decision-making simply does not work in certain situations, or, at the least, it is worse than the alternative decentralized approach.  The response might be, well then, get that central person the necessary knowledge and then he/she can make the best decision.  But such knowledge is actually impossible to attain fully or perfectly, and even if data were available, it must also be correlated and interpreted properly.  Then of course, the data change over time, making it very difficult or impossible to get it in an up-to-date fashion.  And all this is apart from the problems of information distortion.

So in this situation, the better way might be to devolve authority down the organization.  By this I mean actual authority to make decisions with validity.  Different types of decisions to be sure require different levels of authority.  A board or president obviously has authority over a broad and general scope, and also a measure of veto authority.  An academic officer likewise, though over a smaller scope.  But some kinds of authority, within the limits set by the “constitutional” rules, can be “pushed” down to departments, who would then operate with relative autonomy.  This alleviates the necessity of trying to get approval for so many decisions that really are best made at subsidiary levels AND have little or no effect at higher levels if they happen to turn out to be mistaken.  Moreover, mistakes might be more likely as all authority is pushed upward, since no single person (or even two or three) can have the knowledge of all things necessary to know.  This encourages and facilitates innovative decision-making and at the same time, does not threaten the overall institution.  And in the current world of higher education, the ability to innovate in changing conditions is absolutely imperative.  Finally, it just makes sense that in a higher education setting the “street level bureaucrats” (faculty) in each academic area have the essential local knowledge not possessed by anyone else.  Moreover, if the low-level actions do not affect the overall organization, then there is no danger from the devolved decision-making.

Again, potential self-interest plays an important role. It is not that every person is self-interested, but some may be.  It is also not that every person is influenced toward self-interest by the institutional environment in which they find themselves, but some may be.  But when that occurs, and occurs in the context of a college utilizing a hierarchical governance, actions are driven by factors not in the interests of the entire organization.  This in turn is not the direct result of some single self-interested person “gumming up the works” but as information is passed up the chain of command or orders passed down, both of which may be distorted initially, leading to multiplied distortion in transmission.  The solution then may be a devolution of authority as well as checks and balances” on any authority, that can be exercised on a regular basis.

This ends my long post.  I hope it provides some food for thought for consideration of how we organize institutions in a way that best achieves their respective goals.  A great deal of what I have written is theoretical.  I would like at some point to flesh it out in specifics.  But that can wait.

If the reader wishes to pursue more reading on this topic, below is a short list of recommended sources.

Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity.  Princeton University, 2005.

Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules.  Cambridge University, 1985,

Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy.  Little, Brown, 1967.

Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic.  University of Nebraska, 1987.

Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism.  Penguin, 2015.

James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.  University of Michigan, 1962.