**The Elements of a Worldview**

I have already introduced the elements of any worldview in the Introduction. The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate in some detail on those elements. To reiterate, these elements are common to all worldviews, Christian and non-Christian. The particular set of elements I have collected I believe represent the most important aspects of worldviews. Of course it can be argued that my list is not as complete as it could be. I might have added an element respecting the political vision of people, how they think about community, or how they think about sociality. After all, humans are social creatures by virtue of the *imago Dei*. So something about how this fits with a worldview would have been acceptable. Nevertheless I chose to omit this element because I consider it a derivative of the main elements, for example, “What is the *summum bonum*?” I might have also chosen to include the question of the beautiful. What is beauty? This is the aesthetic question, an important one, and one frequently misunderstood even by Christians. But again, I have made the judgment that, the question of beauty, though important, may not be as crucial as others.[[1]](#footnote-1) Likewise I chose to omit some other, arguably valuable, potential elements that would be derived from the main elements.

At any rate, the following list comprises what I consider to be the crucial questions of life. Some might call these perennial questions, at least some of which virtually any thinking person asks themselves at some time or other.[[2]](#footnote-2) These questions are, as I have said, crucial in that the answers to them constitute foundational aspects of human thought and action. To put it another way, to get an answer “wrong” leads to less than optimal human flourishing, even grave consequences for human existence, and ultimately even spiritual death. In this chapter, I will discuss the possible answers to the questions, but I will not engage here in prescribing the “correct” answers. That will be postponed to the chapter on the variety of worldviews and their respective answers to the crucial questions.

With that background, let me first list the seven perennial questions, with their corresponding philosophical categories where applicable:

1. How do we know anything? Can we know? (Epistemology)
2. What is real? What is the nature of reality? (Ontology)
3. What are human beings like? Want is human nature like, if human have any? (Anthropology[[3]](#footnote-3))
4. What is right, versus wrong? How do we know the difference? (Ethics)
5. What is the *summum bonum* of life, the highest good, or simply the good?
6. Does God exist and if he does, what is He like? (Theological doctrine of God)
7. Does history have meaning or purpose? (Teleology)

The Question of Sub-Questions

I made mention of this question earlier. Once answers to the crucial or perennial questions of life have been answered, we may then proceed in constructing our specific worldview of some particular discipline of area of knowledge, to pose sub-questions. For example, suppose I aim to construct a worldview of politics. Perhaps I would be interested in the best form of political governance. I would first wish to pose the crucial question of the nature of man. Suppose, for the sake of argument, I conclude that man’s nature is consistent with the traditional orthodox view of humans. Now I may begin to ask questions that allow me to apply that principle. For example, I may ask, What would be the best kind of institutional arrangement for any government, given the sin nature, and concluding that humans will as a result sometimes (or most of the time) act so as to abuse power, possibly that the more power they have the greater the tendency will be? That is a rather long sub-question designed to aid one in thinking about politics specifically.

These kinds of sub-questions, while not at the level of the more abstract or general perennial questions, are still important for each given discipline. Without them one cannot be expected to make any meaningful application of the broader principles established by the answers to crucial questions. As soon then as one has addressed the perennial questions, it will be time to pose these now equally important sub-questions. I will address this topic in greater detail in the section on integration. We now turn to the first of the perennial questions: the knowledge question.

Are Answers to the Crucial Questions Binary?

It may be asked whether the answers given to the elemental questions forming a worldview are “binary,” that is, either/or answers whereby one answer is completely correct and any other is wrong. To be sure there are better and worse sets of answers. In addition, there are better and worse individual answers to given questions. Moreover there are certainly correct answers and answers that are just wrong in comparison to the objective standard of a Christian worldview. However, I do not assert that one may not attain partial truth in an answer or in a given worldview. Nevertheless, partial truth is not where one would wish to remain, even though some parts of the worldview are valid. The goal for any individual is to get as close to a consistent, coherent worldview that corresponds most closely with the truth of Scriptural principles. Given man’s fallen nature, this may be difficult or in some cases impossible. But the goal remains and may well be achievable with the aid of special revelation, common grace and the Holy Spirit. Likely few or none have an absolutely perfect worldview by Scriptural standards. But that does not negate the attempt to attain one.

How Do We Know? What Can We Know?

The question of how we know is that of epistemology, a philosophical term, but one that is crucial for theological thought and for any aspect of alleged knowledge. If Christians (or anyone else) cannot rely on the truth claims that are advanced about reality, then all knowledge becomes relativized. Relativism in ethics and other actions inevitably follows. In recent decades, a move to “naturalize” epistemology has arisen. Mostly it has taken place in opposition to traditional empirical epistemology. The essence of this move is to reverse the hierarchy used to obtain knowledge. The older approach placed philosophy at the top of the hierarchy; philosophy then governed (in some way) the scientific method (empiricism).[[4]](#footnote-4) Naturalized epistemology turned the tables and, at least theoretically, place what scientists did at the top, governing philosophy.[[5]](#footnote-5) If we substitute the word “theology” for philosophy, we can see the same problem in relation to Christian thought. Everything is reduced to the empirical. *A priori* principles are dismissed. Biblical revelation is also dismissed, though it had been in the area of epistemology since the advent of Logical Postivism of the 1920s and 1930s.[[6]](#footnote-6) In the end, if an epistemology of truth as virtue and as possible is rejected, even knowledge of God disappears.

The traditional definition of knowledge is justified, true, belief.[[7]](#footnote-7) If the three parts of the definition can be satisfied in some specified way, then one can assert knowledge. Notice that one element of knowledge itself is that what is alleged is actually true. Let us examine this issue in more detail, beginning with justification. Since Descartes (formally, and before him, informally) some claim alleged to be true had to be “backed” or justified by some sort of authority, either data from the external world, or some sort of written authority or a rational argument.[[8]](#footnote-8) Justification has a long history but it has been recently contested, mainly by those who wished to naturalize epistemology, essentially removing justification as irrelevant.

To be called knowledge, a proposition must also be true. This means in essence that the proposition must exhibit an objective correspondence with what is really the case. It has truth value. This requirement seems obvious, and even sufficient (as well as necessary), but knowledge, traditionally defined, also requires that the proposition be sufficiently backed by evidence or by an a *priori[[9]](#footnote-9)* and that the proposer also believes it to be true.

What then are the ways one can know, that is, the sources of knowledge, assuming the definition and its elements? This question gets at the heart of the crucial worldview question: How do we know? There are several ways to attain knowledge, each of which can satisfy the requirements above. However, I will posit that one must have precedence to ground all the others and produce genuine and even indubitable knowledge. Humans can attain knowledge through: (1) an inductive/empirical/observational or experiential approach; (2) a rationalistic approach that begins with first principles in the mind; (3) a presuppositional approach that relies on some direct revelation as authoritative; and (4) an intuitive approach (this way is highly suspect). The most common way today is the inductive/empirical approach, sometimes called the “scientific approach.” I have already introduced this approach, but it requires a bit more detail.

Empiricism is predicated on experience. Humans in some way, observe or more formally experiment to gather data, the “buzz” of the external world. They may do this either with some predetermined parameters as to what they are looking for and how to interpret the data or randomly with no particular parameters.[[10]](#footnote-10) Now whether the knower believes that what he observes or senses is as it appears or can be described in some other way is a different question. Some observers believe what they see/measure as it appears is as it really is, while others believe what they see may not at all resemble reality.[[11]](#footnote-11) Nevertheless, for both, something exists. It would be difficult for a Christian to deny either possibility, based solely on what is observed. Individuals who hold that one can know what exists, what is truth, what is right, with some great confidence or in some cases, certainty, and who hold that view because of some bedrock starting point, are *Foundationalists*.[[12]](#footnote-12) Christian epistemologists are almost always Foundationalists. Richard Fumerton puts it this way: “The foundationalist's thesis in short is that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge or justified belief.”[[13]](#footnote-13) Not all Foundationalists are presuppositionalists, but all presuppositionalists are Foundationalists.

More radical forms of empiricism hold that what is observed is socially constructed or “socially known.”[[14]](#footnote-14) And some empiricists believe that all knowledge is evolutionary, that is, it has evolved much like biological evolution, or is reduced to what happens in the brain (cognitive science-based).[[15]](#footnote-15) The latter two theories are Naturalist (run amok) and pose significant obstacles to a Christian worldview.

The aim here is not to get too deeply into the empirical approaches and debates, but simply to introduce the epistemological approach and note that the traditional method has been under attack for some time. For Christians, empiricism cannot rest on nothing or on some arbitrary base. We would expect that a theory can be rooted in an accurate description of reality, or at least in an approximation of an accurate description. This is called realism in epistemology.[[16]](#footnote-16) There is something “there” and we can know something about it, for the most part. Now there are various forms of realism, so Christians can disagree within limits. We cannot always know with sufficient reliability, using empiricism, what actually the reality is like. But we ought to be able to have a way of knowing that is reliable and consistent with special revelation.

This brings me to the main point about empiricism. It cannot produce any absolute knowledge, only contingent, probable, knowledge. That is the very nature of empiricism. Whether it is a flaw due to the Fall is a question that is impossible to answer, though one could argue that God would give a better method via a direct revelation of Himself or some more proscribed form of revelation of Himself and His world. Empiricism therefore is not a wrong epistemological approach. It is merely limited. Moreover, if we also assume, as we do, that humans are fallen and prone to sin and its distortions of the mind, then both any prior assumptions and any conclusions of observation may well be flawed, if not the data itself.

A second way of knowing is rationalism. This has a very old pedigree, going back to Plato’s “idealism” and continuing in Descartes’ rational approach. The basic idea is that one can find a basis for truth in reason itself. One does not turn outward to the external world, but inward to the mind.[[17]](#footnote-17) Of course the veracity of reason alone depends on what is in the mind, what is the “raw material” with which the mind works. Matthias Steup says that rationalism is “*a priori* justified,” in that “what I can know on the basis of a priori justification are conceptual truths (such as "All bachelors are unmarried"), and truths of mathematics, geometry and logic.”[[18]](#footnote-18)

Christians may or may not have a problem with this approach. If the content from which deductions are made is not true, then the conclusions will also be false. On the other hand, even if the content is true in a given instance, one must ask whether such a source is consistently reliable, given the noetic effects of sin, discussed below.

Finally, though I could examine some variations on these first two methods or sources, I will move on the presuppositional approach, which is foundationalist, *a priori*, and based on special revelation (the Christian Bible). Though empiricism and rationalism are not bad in themselves, they are limited more than this method. In fact, reason is used in this approach, as deductions are made from existing texts in revelation. In addition, empiricism is also available, in that one may study and draw conclusions from revelation inductively. But the foundation for all knowledge here is not man, but special revelation.[[19]](#footnote-19) Behind that foundation is God Himself as Ontological Trinity, self-existent and assumed. Beyond God there is nothing else, as He is the bedrock for all truth. He has revealed Himself in His self-attesting special revelation, which is completely reliable because of the God who gave it.

One can see just how epistemology, how we know, can be so important in thinking about worldview. In the end, epistemology is asking a question about both whether we can know (addressing skepticism and relativism) and how much we can know (addressing the limits of human beings). The latter has to do further with human efforts toward autonomous reason, our ability to achieve truth apart from God. Autonomy will be a major theme as we examine alternative non-Christian worldviews. One’s particular view and use of knowledge determines the extent to which one can know anything at all. In fact, van Til argues that the non-believer in particular is by his own autonomous reason (whether empirical or rational) unable to attain truth. He can only get knowledge if common grace is given, or, one might say, “accidentally.” The believer is able to attain knowledge even when using an empirical or rational approach, but only if he relies on special revelation to act as ultimate judge of the truth of what he believes is knowledge. Scripture, as I have already said, establishes the parameters or boundaries for both assumptions or theories to begin and for conclusions, as well as for proper interpretation of “facts.”[[20]](#footnote-20)

What is Real? The Nature of Reality (Ontology)

This section will not take as much space, but not because it is less important. Rather it is more straightforward. The question of what is real would seem to be a rather silly one. After all, we can simply look around us or “kick a rock,” as the British Idealist Berkley was alleged to have been told to do. Reality must be obvious. But unfortunately, the question of reality has been complicated over the centuries, mainly not so much that individuals believed nothing really existed, but because many have questioned exactly what existed (and did not exist) and in what form. The question here of whether God exists is also an ontological or reality question, and will be subsumed under this heading even though in my list of crucial questions it stands alone. I should add too that philosophers consider ontology/reality questions to be sub-set of the larger metaphysics issue.[[21]](#footnote-21)

Thomas Hofweber has listed the major aspects of any study of ontology:

“The larger discipline of ontology can thus be seen as having four parts:

* (O1) the study of ontological commitment, i.e. what we or others are committed to,
* (O2) the study of what there is,
* (O3) the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways,
* (O4) the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered.”[[22]](#footnote-22)

By ontological commitment, Hofweber means that individuals bring with them certain beliefs, which perhaps enable them to answer already questions about what exists and how it exists.[[23]](#footnote-23) Individuals possess pre-commitments. I suppose endless debates could ensue as to what actually does exist and in what form. But the Christian commitment to special revelation makes a good deal of that debate moot. Certainly, we could disagree, for example, as to the particular nature of light or the solar system model of an atom. We cannot see these entities and it seems legitimate to call into question at least parts of the received views on these. They are part of creation and our empirical study of creation will at times inevitably lead to uncertain and tentative theories, subject to modification or discard.[[24]](#footnote-24)

But with regard to God and the metaphysical world (angels, demons, the soul, etc.), the situation changes if we are committed to the authority special revelation. Our autonomous reason might lead us either to deny such entities or decide for ourselves what they are like. Scripture however does not allow us to do that.

Ontology is one of the perennial aspects of any worldview discussion. Our view of what is real and what reality is like will have an immense influence on our thought and practice. If we do not believe God exists and exists in the way He Himself has revealed, we will have a profoundly different approach to life. In some ways, everything else could collapse: any absolute idea of ethics, any desire to interact with the world, etc. We will see some of the ways in which an un-biblical view of reality can affect individuals when we examine the catalog of worldviews.

What are Human Beings Like? Do They Have a Nature and If So, What Is It? (Anthropology)

This section addresses the question of theological anthropology, that is, the question of human nature. This is an especially important question simply because it plays such a crucial role in determining how humans will behave in a given context and how institutions of all kinds ought to be structured to account for those tendencies of behavior. The subject of human nature has been important also for philosophy, as well as any of the social sciences (psychology, sociology, politics, economics, etc.), but our discussion of it will be rooted first in special revelation when we come to the point of answering the question of what human nature is.

Until the twentieth century, one could say that basically there were three views on human nature, and one of those, the Christian view, was dominant from roughly 500 to the eighteenth century. Anything else would have been a variation on those. The three ideas can be labeled: (1) Augustinian-Reformation view (Augustine, Calvin, Luther); (2) the Semi-Pelagian-Enlightenment view (Catholic, Condorcet); and (3) the Lockean view. The Augustinian view takes the position that humans are born both in the image of God and at the same time with a disposition to sin (sin nature). They are not born inherently good or morally neutral.[[25]](#footnote-25) The sin nature affects the entire person, including the mind, the will and the affections. Augustine asserted that after the Fall, man was “not able not to sin.” John Calvin reinforced that view, interpreting Romans 3, writing that Paul indicates “the unvarying corruption of our nature” and “so depraved is his nature that he can be moved or impelled only to evil.”[[26]](#footnote-26) Calvin and others do not argue that humans always do bad things, or always think or will bad, just that they generally think and will sinfully. What accounts for those times when we do not sin is either common grace (for the non-believer) or the grace of the Holy Spirit (for the believer).[[27]](#footnote-27)

I should note that thinkers like the philosopher Thomas Hobbes also expressed ideas about human nature that in some ways resembled the Augustinian view. In Hobbes’ view humans in his “state of nature” are fearful and selfish, and will engage in a “war of all against all,” resulting in the destruction of civilization if they do not limit their own behavior. Hence is born the state, by way of a social contract.[[28]](#footnote-28) Hobbes may well have been influenced by a vestigial Calvinism.

The second view, what I have labeled the Semi-Pelagian-Enlightenment view, is more complex than the Augustinian, as it includes a greater range of variants. But in essence it holds that humans are less affected by the Fall than the Augustinian view teaches. Moreover, humans are born less affected; they are born to some extent, with abilities or capacities that are not sinful in themselves. For example, in the Semi-Pelagian view (held by Aquinas and most Catholic theologians), the Fall does have an effect on individuals, but the will or intellect also have retained some ability to operate freely. They are not, as Paul or Luther would have put it, “in bondage” to sin. Sin is the result of a will that is to some extent free to choose to sin. This of course is a more optimistic view of human nature. But this is only a weaker version of the SP-E view.

With the Enlightenment we encounter an even more optimistic view, one that also sees both humans individually and society as perfectible. The Enlighteners had an immensely expansive idea of the capabilities of human reason.[[29]](#footnote-29) They were able to be so optimistic because for many of them, human nature was inherently good, that is, morally and epistemologically untainted and “bent” to the good and true. As the Enlightenment was so influential on later culture, and still exerts a very powerful influence (despite criticisms and attacks), its associated idea of human nature has also persisted. We will see its influence in some of the worldviews to be examined below. However it was, in its own day, challenged by the view made famous by John Locke. Before moving to this view, I will quote the Marquis de Condorcet, a classic representative of the optimistic view of human nature:

“no bounds have been fixed for the improvement of the human faculties; that the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth above the control of every power that would impede it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us.”[[30]](#footnote-30)

Lest we be too quick to dismiss his view as utopian, we should not forget that many of the intellectual offspring of the Enlightenment were (and are) in fact utopian.

I do not wish to leave the impression that during and after the Enlightenment (c. 1780-1800), the traditional view of human nature was completely abandoned. Certainly, many theologians, ministers and ordinary people continued to believe the Christian view of man’s essential sinfulness. There were some too, Enlighteners themselves, who attempted to combine aspects of the older view with the new thinking. These were often Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, chief among them for our purposes being Adam Smith (d. 1790). Smith combined the ideas of self-interest (not equivalent to selfishness), the traditional notion of selfishness or egoism, and an enlightened idea of “sympathy.” It was possible to be selfish or self-centered, but more commonly one was both self-interested and sympathetic, depending on the particular setting or context.[[31]](#footnote-31) Humans may be sympathetic in some situations and more self-interested (self-love Smith called it) in others, such as in impersonal commercial transactions. Self-interest was not exactly sin, unless it degenerated to selfishness. Moreover sympathy was a kind of “common grace,” though Smith would not have called it that, as it was innate (as “sixth sense”) and not from God directly. He would have appealed to a natural law tradition.[[32]](#footnote-32)

The third major view of human nature was, as I said, made famous by John Locke. In the earlier part of the seventeenth century, Rene Descartes has given us a glimpse of what would be Locke’s more developed view when in 1637, he wrote about the use of unaided reason to derive his own existence and then the existence of everything else. Autonomous reason was able to accomplish much, but to do that, it could not be morally or epistemologically distorted by sin. Locke could have followed the Enlightenment way, but he found a “middle way.” He articulated his notion in his book, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, whose goal was to understand the workings of the human mind in its quest to know. Though Locke wrote there about the sin of human beings, he also expresses his view on the basic innate status of humans when they are born, calling them “blank slates” (literally “white papers”).[[33]](#footnote-33)

If the human was born morally and epistemologically blank, then he/she could remain that way, but for influences that would have to come from the outside. Locke thought of individuals as “blank slates,” or rather, as he actually wrote “a white paper” or “empty cabinet.”[[34]](#footnote-34) To be sure, Locke did not then argue that sin did not exist. Here however he is writing about the way knowledge comes to humans. In addition, for Locke the knowledge of sin is not innate, or, as he puts it, “innate Principles.”[[35]](#footnote-35) Locke is not completely clear as to the source of the knowledge of “Vertues amd Sinnes,” but he seems to say that men do come to know what is sinful—if I may use the word “come” here to indicate some sort of process involving the general method of attaining knowledge.[[36]](#footnote-36) God’s divine law is still the measure of right and wrong to Locke. The issue for him is how one actually attains this knowledge in himself, how he or she appropriates it, knows something to be wrong (or right) and acts accordingly. But this divine law is also capable of being known through the correct use of reason as its content is revealed “in nature.” The power of reason is able to overcome any egoism. Locke rejects the traditional Calvinist idea about depravity. So here we have a subtle but important shift in thought about human nature. The lines of philosophical thought from this point would only further undermine the Christian view.

Locke does say something about man’s “innate” character.[[37]](#footnote-37) He speaks of the will and freedom, reason, and self-love, all elements of human nature in the Christian theological tradition. On freedom or liberty, Locke writes that it is simply the power to choose, or its contrary, not to choose. But man is not free not to will; rather he has choice to will something or its contrary, properly defined. (one cannot either jump off a cliff or jump up from the bottom, but only jump or not jump). The mind determines the will, “desire” determines the mind’s decision, and some “uneasiness” determines the desire.[[38]](#footnote-38) All this comes from man’s being and not from God, or at least not obviously from God.

Reason is for Locke “natural revelation” which God has placed within the “reach of the natural faculties.” This is not too far from Christian views, but Locke goes a bit further to argue that reason is essentially equivalent to special revelation.[[39]](#footnote-39) In fact, special revelation must agree with reason for an alleged truth to be acceptable.

Locke is an interesting and pivotal figure. His “blank slate” psychology has continued to play a crucial role in the “nature versus nurture” debate in the social sciences. But he obviously did not believe that humans were completely “blank” at birth, or that they remained so as they developed. He must be seen as teaching both a measure of nature as well as a measure of nurture, with nurture perhaps taking the lead. This however is precisely a major departure from orthodox Christian tradition. Even though Christians had always understood that humans are shaped in various ways by their environment, this “nurture” was normally in terms of bad influences operating on an already sinful nature. Humans were then not fundamentally better with nurture, except perhaps externally. They could not be made better internally. Only God’s grace could achieve that transformation. Locke therefore is one of several catalysts to the modern view of human nature.

Some of each of the latter two views of human nature could be seen even before the Modern Era began to undermine the traditional Christian view. For example, during the Renaissance period, roughly between 1300 and 1600, some Humanists began to posit that man’s nature was changeable.[[40]](#footnote-40) Man’s free will enabled him to move up or down the “Great Chain of Being” between less human (more “beastly”) and more human (closer to God). The Humanists, like Locke, believed humans had a free will, that is, a will to choose. No doubt, Humanism influenced later thinkers to some extent.

Beginning roughly around 1585, the theological movement known as Arminianism arose, founded by Jacobus Arminius, a Dutch theologian who came out of the Dutch Reformed Church. Arminius began as a Reformed theologian, adhering to a standard Calvinist theological anthropology. But he modified his position with further study. Arminius taught that the Fall profoundly affected man as a whole. Every human was born a sinner in need of grace to do any good. Arminius argued that when Adam and Eve sinned, the “Holy Spirit departed, the conscience was “depraved,” they suffered a ‘privation of the image of God’, they lost their “original righteousness,” which amounted to original sin.[[41]](#footnote-41) Arminius adds, “But in his lapsed and sinful state man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good….”[[42]](#footnote-42) Arminius looks much like a Calvinist with regard to his view of fallen human nature, though he differs when he adds that grace from God is resistible and that the will and intellect retain some natural capability.[[43]](#footnote-43)

The continuing debate however is just how “bad” those effects were. As Arminianism continued to develop, its followers increasingly insisted that the human will at least was relatively free. In fact later Arminians in Holland became rationalists, elevating human reason, not just will, to the highest epistemological status over special revelation.[[44]](#footnote-44) They were less clear as to the effects of sin on other faculties. This vagueness has continued to the present, though at the popular level some will argue for a completely free will and unchanged intellect.

Later Developments in the Ideas of Human Nature

After the Enlightenment, three major figures changed even the new views of human nature far beyond their boundaries. Karl Marx, Charles Darwin and B. F. Skinner all continued, elaborated and significantly modified the older theories.[[45]](#footnote-45) Their work has continued to be accepted by many today. But the work of all of them also substantially distorted the acceptable Christian views.

From the end of the eighteenth century until the publication of Charles Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species* in 1859, this optimistic view of man differed only in details, whether in theology or philosophy. On the theological side, the “New Theology,” borrowed from the German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher and later, Albrecht Ritschl, weakened the orthodox Christian view of human nature even further. Both severely downplayed the effects of original sin on human nature and rejected the long tradition of explaining the effects of the Fall since Augustine. Schleiermacher in particular thinks of sin as a lack of “God consciousness.” The more one is conscious of God as the ground of faith, the less sin is present. Sin itself does not actually condemn anyone, as Schleiermacher was one of the first to teach universalism.[[46]](#footnote-46) Schleiermacher essentially began a line of Liberal Theology that ran from himself through Albrecht Ritschl and Adolph Harnack into the twentieth century, and which spread to the United States as ministers flocked to Germany to study this new theology.

When Charles Darwin published *On the Origin of the Species* in 1859, the theological world was at least partly ready to accept it.[[47]](#footnote-47) The implications of Darwin’s work (as well as his later works) were that since humans apparently did not come by fiat creation of God, the Genesis narrative was false and the theology of sin had to be replaced by some other explanation for human nature.[[48]](#footnote-48) Humans were basically higher animal forms, descended through long ages from much simpler forms. One can see the progressive idea behind Darwin’s thought—he was very much a product of his day. Humans are “getting better,” for no other reason than that natural selection and adaptation were “weeding” out the bad traits and passing on the good.

Karl Marx has had a worldwide influence in philosophy, political and economic thought and practice. His view of human nature has been equally influential and destructive of the traditional orthodox view. Marx did not, as many think, believe that humans were inherently good. But he did believe that they were malleable, in fact that human nature itself was changeable. But humans were changed not by some inward action, but by economic systems, by the organization of production. Marx believed capitalism was the dominant ideology (he conceptualized it as an ideology, not merely as a way of producing and exchanging goods and services) in his day but that it would inevitably produce “alienation” and a class consciousness among the proletariat (factory workers) because of the increased competition among the bourgeoisie class, leading to unemployment and/or lower wages. Eventually the dissatisfaction would produce a revolution, leading to a socialist state. But as individuals now operated under a new economic system—non-capitalist and cooperative—their “latent” cooperative nature would emerge and the state would “wither away.” Utopia would be achieved.[[49]](#footnote-49) It is worth noting that the Anarchist movement has much the same view of human nature, but its adherents believe revolution must be forced first, as did many of Marx’s followers, including Lenin.[[50]](#footnote-50)

Darwin’s optimistic view of human nature fit well with the equally optimistic views of Liberal theology. Marx’s ideas had a wide following by the end of the nineteenth century. As the twentieth century arrived and progressed, three views of human nature co-existed uneasily. First was Locke’s blank slate idea, the emphasis being placed on nurture, though nature had a small role. This view actually is seen in modified form in Marx, who taught a kind of perfectibility of humans in the context of a particular economic and political environment. Second was the optimistic, progressive view of Liberals and of Darwin and his followers. Third one finds a lingering traditional orthodox view of man in the image of God but fallen. With variations, one can see all of these today.

Though B. F. Skinner was not the towering figure like Sigmund Freud, his view of human nature has become prominent until very recently, and still important, in certain social sciences, particularly psychology. The Psychological view, on the other hand, derives its understanding of human nature from observation and experimentation. Seeking scientific respectability, psychologists tended to move toward more naturalistic explanations for human behavior.[[51]](#footnote-51) But they were still faced with the problem of how to explain external behavior with a satisfactory internal view of human nature. Locke’s “white paper” theory was popular, as was a purely physical-material explanation. The problem has not really disappeared. At present, the dominant view of human nature among psychologists is some variation of the blank slate, though some have argued that humans have no nature. In addition, psychologists have been attracted to the theory of evolution, which teaches that human behavior and the “mind,” have changed over a long period of time for the better. It is not always clear how psychologists have reconciled these different views within the profession. But it is certain that none except Christian psychologists still accept the traditional Christian understanding of human nature — yet it is a crucial issue in the discipline. Explaining why human beings do what they do cannot be done simply by observing stimuli and resultant behavior, as the Behaviorists did in connection with B. F. Skinner’s views. It may be the dominant view that “Human behavior is a product both of our innate human nature and of our individual experience and environment.”[[52]](#footnote-52) No one would deny that experience and environment play a role, but sin also must be accounted for in order to diagnose problems accurately. The foundational assumption must be that humans are created in the image of God, but that the Fall produced a sin nature that has profoundly affected the internal and external lives of all humans.

Before we leave this section, it will be useful to examine briefly the Existentialist view of human nature, which at one time (the 1960s to the 197os) was significant, but which is now diffused into various disciplines but not formally popular. Very simply, Existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre believed that humans had no nature at all.[[53]](#footnote-53) As Sartre would put it, “existence comes before essence.”[[54]](#footnote-54) One develops an “essence” (a being) by acting in the world, by using one’s freedom. In one sense this view resembles Locke’s blank slate, but Locke allowed for some pre-existing “structure” of the mind which cooperated in shaping the human being. This structure was “built in” by God. But Sartre was an atheist. Therefore the human came into the world with essentially nothing and “made” himself what he would become.

At the popular level, beliefs about human nature in modern times range from strictly orthodox to wildly mystical, and everything between. But it seems that the prevailing attitude among people in general is that humans are at least fallible (not to say sinful—for many that would go too far) but that they are basically good and well-meaning at heart, with a few notable exceptions in history. The discipline of psychology has also had a large influence on popular thought. The discipline has evolved from a metaphysical analysis of the soul applying theology and philosophy to an empirical discipline rooted in experimentation.

I will have more to say about how various worldviews have utilized, revised or dismissed these views of human nature. But for now, we must move on to another element of any worldview. The point here has been to survey the possible views and to indicate (giving away a little) which is the Christian view. I have spent more time on this section due to the central role this element plays.

What is Right and Wrong (Ethics)

This is another element of a worldview that has been a central concern throughout history.[[55]](#footnote-55) Very simply, and fairly self-evidently, ethics concerns itself with the differences between what is right action versus what is wrong action. It generally is more concerned with external actions than with the internal motivations and dispositions, though we will see that some ethical theories include assumptions about human motivations. In history, many ethical theories have arisen and most have persisted in some form and to some extent today. This chapter will mainly survey these theories, each of which could be found to underlie a worldview.

W. Andrew Hoffecker has written that “Ethical systems are not created *ex nihilo*. They are a function of theological, anthropological, cosmological, and social presuppositions.”[[56]](#footnote-56) Hoffecker is correct and also implicitly makes the important point that most ethical systems derive from human autonomy seeking to free individuals from the perceived ethical chains that would limit action. If we remember our discussion of human nature, we can see that since humans are “naturally” sinful, they would desire to free themselves from responsibility before God. Nevertheless, most systems devised by humans do to some extent share at least a few elements of a Christian ethical system, a fact I will reiterate below. Those elements are vestigial remains of Christianity, or else were given by common grace.

As we examine the non-Christian worldviews, we will bear in mind a few questions: (1) How do we know what is right and wrong? (the question of ethical epistemology); (2) How does our moral knowledge come to us?; (3) Is ethics merely a function of social and cultural mores or is there a transcendent reference point in morality?; (4) What is the immediate basis of ethical decision making? (immediate source); How do Christians and non-Christians differ in their evaluation of the sources?; (5) Should we distinguish between “customary norms” and general, transcendent principles?; (6) What is the difference between subjective and objective ethics? And Does a truly objective ethical theory exist?; (7) Is belief in God necessary to an objective ethics?[[57]](#footnote-57) We will see that different worldviews will arrive at vastly different answers to these questions.

I will first simply list the major ethical systems, then discuss some of them, looking for their main characteristics. Ethical systems include: (1) utilitarianism; (2) egoism; (3) Divine Command Theory (DCT); (4) natural law; (5) hedonism; (6) naturalized ethics (Darwinian, etc.); (7) virtue ethics; (8) social contract ethics; (9) Kantian ethics (deontological); (10) ethical nihilism. If we were to classify these various systems, we could range them along a spectrum based on main characteristics. Some systems are rooted in human desires and happiness, some on duty, some on an authority, and some on consequences, while one system (nihilism) has no foundations.

Without an ethical core a worldview would provide no guidance for individuals seeking to know what to do or under what circumstances they might do it if allowable. Since everyone has a worldview, and every worldview has some ethical core, then every individual does, whether consciously or reflexively, apply a set of ethical principles to potential or real decisions. The question remains, however, as to what are the better and best ethical systems. Certainly some of the systems listed could be generally consistent with a Christian worldview. Perhaps utilitarianism would be acceptable within limits, as it usually is predicated on the consequences of an action, good or bad, better or worse. Perhaps too deontological ethics actually resembles a Christian ethical system, as it is rooted in duty to do the right thing. Moreover virtue ethics does partake of Christian principles to the extent the virtues are traditional Christian ones. Despite the usefulness however of these ethics, they lack the very thing that is necessary. They are not explicitly grounded in special revelation. Only Divine Command Theory fits the bill here. Not even natural law is sufficient, though it too can be and has been useful to Christian thinkers for many centuries.

To elaborate, consequentialist ethical systems like utilitarianism, are only as good as any limiting principles. Otherwise, if an ethical decision depends only on the outcome, and the outcome is determined or measured by the individual, it will tend to become some form or happiness or welfare. In that case, the individual may choose to do something that improves his welfare even if it harms someone else’s. And in a collective decision-making context, it will be possible for the majority of the group to outvote a minority and in the process to harm them while benefiting themselves.[[58]](#footnote-58) Actions based on utility do not always harm others. In those cases, utilitarianism is acceptable. But if harm is possible, an ethical principle or principles must be introduced to limit such actions. Divine Command Theory, as it is grounded on revelation and on principles that can be properly deduced from revelation, serves that purpose. Moreover, for the Christian, it alone of all possible Divine Command Theory ethical systems, contains unmixed truth. To put it more clearly, Christian special revelation is the source of the highest form of ethics, even if some systems also resemble in parts that revelation.

To take another example, deontological ethics, a system devised formally by Immanuel Kant in the later eighteenth century, comes close to a Divine Command Theory ethics.[[59]](#footnote-59) Kant articulated a theory that was rooted in both duty and the principle that every person should be treated as an end and not a means (similar to the “Golden Rule”).[[60]](#footnote-60) The problem is that whether the actual application is acceptable depends on the particular content of Kant’s ethical duties. To what extent does he support an explicitly biblical set of ethical principles? The answer is ambiguous at best. Moreover Kant also explicitly denied that knowledge of the metaphysical realm was possible.[[61]](#footnote-61) If so, then he is effectively cut off from principles he says we ought to follow at any rate.

Natural law on the other hand seems a promising route for ethics. Natural law principles are universal, absolute and timeless, according to the classical theorists of this system.[[62]](#footnote-62) However several problems arise. First there are actually now about 120 different natural law theories.[[63]](#footnote-63) Which one are we to choose? The Classical School would seem the most desirable, but only because it is most closely linked to biblical principles themselves, having been developed in the Middle Ages by Christian theologian-philosophers.[[64]](#footnote-64) Finally, what does one do when morals shift in a culture that asserts that natural law is its ethical foundation? In fact ethical rules have shifted, even where natural law principles have been popular. Do we change the specific natural law principles we argue everyone knows—but obviously doesn’t, or doesn’t care about. A natural law theorist could respond that the principles remain valid regardless of whether anyone follows them. But he also would argue that everyone knows these principles. He must therefore either introduce a more robust view of human sinfulness (Romans 1)—natural law theorists have been reluctant to do so--or he must acknowledge some relativism inherent in natural law.

In each of these examples, one can easily see that flaws. The systems I did not address are even more obviously problematic, or in radical opposition to Christianity. Ethics is a crucial issue for all humans. But as I said, it also exhibits a large range of views, which we will examine as we find them embedded in various worldviews we will encounter.

Does History Have Meaning, *Telos*?

It might seem at first glance that this question is rather less important than others, that we could get along without it. However, upon further reflection we might ask ourselves what is actually “happening” in any study of history or any consideration of the movement of time. The simple fact is that if history has no goal and if that goal is not agent-directed and if that agent is not an omnipotent and omniscient God, then we could not count on any regularity or on any outcome except randomness—certainly no beginning at creation and no prospect of an end brought about by that God, and no certainty at all that history has meaning for us, that we are providentially governed. If that were the case, we would have nothing to bring any real comfort or any real hope. To know that history is meaningful, that God is, to use a trite but true phrase, “in control” from beginning to end, does bring comfort and hope. It also ought to energize Christians for service in all vocations to which we are called.

When I speak of history here, I am referring to the “speculative philosophy of history” rather than the “critical philosophy of history.” The former deals with patterns and purpose (or purpose-like movement) in history, while that latter deals with various problems regarding what we know about the past, etc.[[65]](#footnote-65) Critical history is worth of study for worldview purposes, but most of what it addresses can be handled in other questions, for example epistemology, ontology). The major questions for critical historians are whether history can be studied like a “hard” science, whether one can know the past with any degree of certainty, and whether our biases disable the objective study of history.[[66]](#footnote-66) A Christian worldview of knowledge and reality can answer these issues fairly easily. As important as those issues are, I will concentrate on the *telos* or purpose issue.

At least three major views of historical patterns can be identified, along with their variants.[[67]](#footnote-67) One of the ancient views is the cyclical view, which posited that history moves in some defined course (by virtue of fate) to a predetermined cataclysmic end, to begin again and follow the same course without deviation to the end of that next cycle, and so on forever. In its extreme form, all the actors remain the same and individually follow the same course of life down to the minutest details. The other ancient view is the Christian or linear pattern. This one sees a definite beginning, a definite end, and a “middle” providentially guided by God to that end. Christ then is the theological “middle” of that time. Individuals do make real choices, but the overall course of time is moved along and governed by God.[[68]](#footnote-68) The third, more modern view, is a modification of the linear view, and was posited by Giambattista Vico in the seventeenth century. Vico combined the linear view as the macro-pattern with cycles occurring throughout at the micro-level. It accounts for the seeming repetitions of historical events, but preserves the overall pattern in its essentially Christian form. As I said, each of these views has its variants, some minimal and some radical. We can also see Hegelian, Marxist, and Postmodern views.[[69]](#footnote-69) We will encounter some of these again when we examine the specific elements of various worldviews.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce and detail the elements of any worldview, in their historical development and in their philosophical and theological diversity. But this is only part of the task ahead. When we get to each individual worldview in the next chapter, we will be required to sort out the elements of this chapter to specific aspects of those views. From the range of possible sub-elements we will discover those actually used by each worldview. But we have been exposed at least to the general idea of what makes up a worldview. I repeat that this list is not fool-proof. But I believe it will serve the essential purpose in getting at the heart of what the elements of a worldview are in terms of its content. Anything else may be important but at this point secondary.

1. The question of beauty, like that of the good and truth can be argued to be crucial. Since the three are often spoke of together—truth, beauty and good. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. At this point the language may begin to look more like traditional philosophy, with its talk of perennial issues. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. This category is not equivalent to the discipline of anthropology. It resembles the older and still valuable category of theological anthropology. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See D. Wade Hands, *Reflection Without Rules*, 130ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Quine, W. V. 1969. “Epistemology Naturalized.” In: *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*. New York: Columbia Press, pp. 69–90. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. On Logical Postivism see [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See on the definition, any standard philosophy text or, to cite a specialized monograph, Robert Audi, *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, Third edition. Routledge, 2010. For a Christian perspective, see W. Jay Wood, *Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous*. IVP Academic, 1998. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. On this element, see Justification and warrant are essentially equivalent terms. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Presuppositionalism and its justificatory principle will be raised below as I introduce the ways of knowing. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. This issue is tied up with that of the question of reality/ontology, discussed below. Knowing and what is known are always related. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Again, it is not really here the nature of what is known that concerns us (that will be addressed), but how one came to believe that as true. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. On Foundationalism, see [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See Richard Fumerton, “Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2010), at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/>, retrieved July 22, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Thomas Kuhn, for one, had a social emphasis in his epistemology, but some social constructivists go further. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See on the former, the work of the Churchlands, Donald Campbell and the later work of Karl Popper. On the latter, see the work of Alvin Goldman and Herbert Simon. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See Del Ratzsch, *Science and Its Limits*: *The natural Sciences in Christian Perspective*. InterVarsity, 2000, 82-86. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See W. Andrew Hoffecker and Gary Scott Smith, editors, *Building a Christian Worldview*, 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Matthias Steup, “Epistemology,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2005), at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/>, retrieved July 21, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. See Cornelius van Til, *A Survey of Christian Epistemology (In Defense of Biblical Christianity*). Presbyterian and Reformed, 1962 and Gregory Bahnsen, *Presuppositional Apologetics Stated and Defended*. American Vision, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. So called facts are value laden also; no fact can be said to be value neutral but comes already “interpreted” by humans with their own presuppositions. The question then is whether their presuppositions are grounded in Scripture or not. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Metaphysics means literally, “beyond the physical”—what is there, if anything, beyond what we can see, touch, smell, feel? [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Thomas Hofweber, “Logic and Ontology,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2011) at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/ retrieved July 21, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, is therefore correct in his historical critique of how science develops and progresses. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. For more on this view, see Anthony Hoekema, *Created in God’s Image*. Eerdmans, 1994. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1559), edited by John T. McNeil, translated by Ford Lewis Battles, 2 volumes. Westminster Press, 1960, II.iii.2 and II.iii.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. On common grace, general grace from God (based on Matthew 5: 45), see the classic work by Abraham Kuyper, *Common Grace* (1902-1905), currently in translation from the Dutch. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge University, 1996. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. This idea was at the heart of what defined the period, as we will see more about in the next chapter. See Charles Vereker, *Eighteenth-Century Optimism*. Liverpool University Press, 1967 and John Passmore, *The Perfectibility of Man*, Third edition. Scribner’s, 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. *Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind*. J. Johnson, 1795, Introduction. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. One can see Smith’s ideas in his two most important works: *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). The latter of course is his classic treatment of trade, division of labor, the invisible hand, and the case against mercantilism. But one cannot miss Smith’s treatment of human nature. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. See [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1700), 2 volumes, edited by Peter H. Nidditch. Clarendon Press, 1979, vol. 1, 55, 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. See *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1700), 2 vols, edited by Peter H. Nittitch. Clarendon, 1979, p. 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Ibid., p. 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. See Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. This does not mean innate ideas, placed in us and known immediately, since he rejects that idea. The Puritans on the other hand had accepted this notion as a principle derived from the Bible. God placed in humans certain immediate knowledge, a *sensus divinitatis*. It is essentially equivalent to what one finds in Romans 1, an immediate knowledge of God that, however, does not justify. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, op. cit., pp. 244-251. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. See his *Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695), edited by George W. Ewing. Regnery Gateway, 1965. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. The term “Humanism” as used here is not the same as the modern Secular Humanist, though they share a few common features. Renaissance Humanists did not share the modern aversion to religion. See Paul Oskar Kristeller and Michael Mooney, *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources*. Columbia University, 1979 and Idem, editor, *Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. University of Chicago, 1956. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *The Writings of James Arminius*, translated by James Nichols, 3 vols. Baker Bookhouse reprint, 1977, vol. 2, pp. 77-79. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Ibid., vol. I, p. 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Ibid., pp. 253-254. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. See Andrew Fix, Prophecy and Reason: *The Dutch Collegiants in the Early Enlightenment*. Princeton University, 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. I chose to highlight Skinner instead of Freud because of the latter’s similarity to more pessimistic ideas of human nature, albeit not founded on religious principles, but on an alleged scientific basis. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. See Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, trans. And edited by H. R. MacKintosh and J. S. Stewart. T&T Clark, 1928. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Many Reformed, Lutheran, Baptist and other theologians however remained true to the Augustinian interpretation of the image and of the Fall and its effects. So it would not be accurate to say Darwin and Liberal theology were unanimously accepted. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of the Species* (1859). Harvard University Press, Facsimile edition, 1964. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. For all this, see Karl Marx, *Capital*, 3 vols. (1867-1894), translated by Ben Fowkes and David Fernbach. Penguin, 1992-1993, as well as many other of Marx’s works. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. On Anarchism, see Peter Marshall, *Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism*. PM Press, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. See Leslie Stevenson and David L. Haberman, Ten Theories of Human Nature, Third edition.

    Oxford University, 1998, p, 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Alan S. Miller and Satoshi Kanazawa, “Ten Politically Incorrect Truths About Human Nature,”

    Psychology Today, July 1, 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Sartre explicitly states, “…there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it.” See *Existentialism and Humanism*, trans. By P. Mairet. Methuen, 1948, in *The Study of Human Nature: A Reader*, Second edition, edited by Leslie Stephenson. Oxford University, 2000, p. 188. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. See his *Existentialism and Humanism*, trans. By P. Mairet. Methuen, 1948. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. For a massive survey, see Terrence Irwin, *The Development of Ethics*, 3 volumes. Oxford University Press, 2007-2011. This work runs to over 2,800 pages. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. In W. Andrew Hoffecker and Gary Scott Smith, editors, *Building a Christian Worldview*, *Volume 2, The Universe, Society and Ethics*. Presbyterian and Reformed, 1988, 343. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. These questions are drawn from Ibid., 344. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. On this latter collective context, see Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Miller and Jeffrey Paul, editors, *Utilitarianism: The Aggregation Question*. Cambridge University, 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. See Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), Revised edition, edited by Mary Gregor and Jans Timmermann. Cambridge University, 2012 and the *Metaphysics of Ethics* (1796). [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. *Groundwork*, Third edition, translated by James W. Ellington. Hackett, 1993, 36, 4: 429. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. This is found in his famous *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787), edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge University, 1998. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. A very good and accessible synthesis of natural law is J. Budiszewski, *What We Can’t Not Know: A Guide*. Spence Publishing, 2003. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. See Howard Kainz, *Natural Law: And Introduction and Re-examination*. Open Court, 2004, xiv-xv. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Such as Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologia* (1265-1273). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. See William Dray, *Philosophy of History*. Pearson, 1992. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Ronald Nash, *The Meaning of History*. Broadman and Holman, 1998 and David Bebbington, *Patterns in History: A Christian Perspective*. Baker, 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Augustine is the major figure in this tradition, but he derived it from the Bible’s presentation of history. See Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. On these see Nash and on the Postmodern in particular, see Ernst Breisach, *On the Future of History: The Postmodernist Challenge and Its Aftermath.* University of Chicago, 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)