Today, President Donald J. Trump (R) declared a national emergency due to the southern border. His decree came not long after signing a spending bill that included money to secure the border. Let that sink in for a moment.

Trump is relying on the National Emergencies Act (1976), which was an effort to reign in unrestricted executive power. Under the Act, Congress could vote, with simple majorities, to rescind a presidential declaration of emergency. Of course, the president can veto that resolution, which Congress can then override with two-thirds in each chamber. The Watergate babies in Congress wanted to check the president’s power, but ended up boxing themselves in to needing a super-majority to return to the status quo.

Presidents have invoked the Act frequently since then. In 1979, Jimmy Carter declared an emergency and froze Iranian property after the Islamic Revolution. Carter believed the event met the act’s standard of, “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security.” After today, presidents have declared 59 national emergencies and now 32 are still in effect, including Carter’s original order. Emergencies were declared after 9/11, to forestall a swine flu outbreak, and to prevent diamond imports from Sierra Leone.

Congress’s attempt to squeeze the Executive has been a spectacular failure. In this sense, Trump’s actions may be legal and not all that different from previous administrations. But Trump has managed to undercut his own argument, primarily through poor timing.

Declarations of Emergency are supposed to allow the president to act decisively when speed is of the essence or when Congress is unable to resolve the matter through poor timing or lack of expertise. Had Trump declared an emergency during the shutdown, he would have better grounds. Had he vetoed this spending bill, assuming the veto would survive, he could argue Congress’s actions were so insufficient he had no choice but to act on his own.

Instead, he signed the bill, which explicitly funded the border wall–but at lower levels than the president demanded. The bill also provided other border security measures–more agents, more technology, and more resources in general. This is evidence that Congress not only deliberately acted (with large, bipartisan majorities) on the matter, but acted through earmarked funding. This power of the purse is at the heart of Congress’s explicit Article 1 powers.

This puts President Trump’s emergency declaration in a precarious position. He cannot claim to be moving in the absence of Congress, or even to be pressed because of Congress’s inability to resolve the conflict. His declaration is now in direct opposition to Congress’s stated will–that he signed. All of this means President Trump’s move is more vulnerable to judicial intervention. If he manages to lose this, it will be his own fault. Given these facts, the federal courts should check the president’s action.

Finally, if members of Congress had an shred of institutional dignity, they would use this opportunity to repeal the National Emergencies Act. For too long, our first branch of government has ceded far too much authority to the second branch. While it will not happen, this would be good for American government and bad for the Trump Administration.