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Another Modest Proposal

02 Nov 2015

As we watched the Democratic and Republican Party presidential debates, I have heard some, but not nearly enough, discussion of the problems of the “regulatory state,” that is, that “Fourth Branch” of government affectionately called bureaucracy.  Since this is a national election, I will confine my comments to the Federal agencies such as EPA, FCC, FEC, SEC (no, not the Southeastern Conference), HHS, IRS, CPSC, NHSTA, the Justice Department, and many others, nearly covering the entire alphabet.  Readers likely already know about my posts about bureaucracy, both theoretical and practical.  They also probably know my severe reservations about bureaucratic agencies or organizations in general. Their inefficiencies, their politicization, their inability or unwillingness to be responsive to those they serve, and the reasons why, given the structure of bureaucratic institutions and the nature of humans, they frequently fail, especially at the Federal level where they are so large.  This post takes a different approach.

I want us to assume the Republicans will win the White House next year.  I have some advice to give to the nominee and next (imaginary) Republican president.  Of course, no one of them will see this post.  I have no illusions that many people will read it (excepting of course our Bereans faithful readers).  Nor am I optimistic that any candidate in the next 100 years will listen to this kind of advice—even if it came directly from heaven or Hillary Clinton (not to compare).  But here goes anyway.

If the chief executive wishes to address the problem of the increasingly oppressive regulatory regime at the Federal level, he must begin to develop a strategy now.  He should hire or consult the very best political economists, probably secretly, since if many people knew what he was up to, they would panic at the potential loss of crony largesse.  These people should be well-versed in the political-economic theory of public choice as it particularly applies to bureaucracy.  In the recent past, these would have included scholars like James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Anthony Downs, Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, William Niskanen, and others, whom they could still of course read.  But the newer generation can also be consulted with profit.  These individuals should inform the candidate(s) of the problematic nature and function of bureaucracy, especially as an agency gets bigger and/or takes more authority by “mission creep” and interpretational sleight of hand.  Once the candidate achieved a solid working knowledge of the failures, the strategy could begin.  This is where things would get brutally political.

About 800 or so of the top bureaucratic heads are appointed by the president.  Each of these must, well before the election, be thoroughly examined as to their ideological views.  Any and all of these heads are then placed on a list to be either fired upon the inauguration of the president or retained.  My guess is that at present, almost all appointed heads were appointed because they agreed in principle with current president’s ideological agenda.  Within 100 days of inauguration, they would have to go.  In the meantime, the candidate must develop his “good list” of individuals who possess solid and consistent conservative credentials—not merely political allies, or donors, or people to whom he owes favors.  They must also be competent in an area over which some agency presides.  They must understand fully the workings of bureaucracies, their pathologies, and how wisely to make certain that agencies act according to the president’s agenda instead of obstructing it (as mid-level and lower-level bureaucrats can do).

Within those 100 days then, every Federal agency, or nearly every one, would have a new head and new “underlings.”  The next task is to address the rules and regulations of each agency.

The appointed new officials would need to have the will to examine every rule and regulation under their jurisdiction and eliminate or modify those that offer little or no benefit compared top cost, or which appear to be in violation of existing statutory or constitutional authority.  Of course these officials will have already examined and analyzed the regulations beforehand, as will the presidential candidate and his advisors.  This move to reduce regulation is bold and certain to be heavily criticized by liberals, and even some on the right who prefer cronyism.  It is certainly not something any president up to now has dared to attempt.  But I argue that if regulation is to be addressed, this may well be just as good an approach as a more incremental one from Congress or the uncertainty of the courts.  All the work that goes into it can be overturned by the next president, but perhaps if time is sufficient the voters will be able to see the positive results before the next election cycle.

One more important issue, regarding more about how to determine which rules and regulations must go and which can be left alone.  Some regulations are clearly nothing but thinly veiled (or not even that) attempts at government “imperialism.”  They have no benefits and huge costs to many.  Costs are measured in terms of economic and liberty burdens.  In addition, they often fall outside the scope of the statute under which they were issued.  Or they are arguably obviously unconstitutional, but have not yet been challenged in court or the courts have refused to strike them down.  I can think of several elements of the Affordable Care Act (aka, Obamacare) which would satisfy all of the above requirements for elimination.

No one should be under any misapprehension that my radical proposal is easy or even feasible (at least not yet).  But it is a serious proposal, not “A Modest Proposal” by Swift, which was certainly facetious.  But then I am no Jonathan Swift.  I am not sure how I could have made this proposal tongue-in-cheek in today’s politically correct world.  Federal politicians, if you are out there and providentially happen to read this blog, please consider what I have argued.  The long-term fate of our nation as a viable republic depends to some large degree on action in this area.